1980 election reflected an affirmation of his conservative agenda, and he used his victory as a platform to enact cuts in taxes. To others, however, the election seemed more a rejection of 
Abstract:
In the early 1950s, politicians apparently allowed themselves to be spectators to the anticommunist witch hunt of Senator Joe McCarthy and his supporters, leading to a particularly grim chapter in American politics. In part, they did so because they thought the public supported McCarthy. Although politicians lacked contemporary public opinion data, they apparently inferred McCarthy's support from key Senate race outcomes. The few senators who initially stood up to McCarthy lost their reelections when McCarthy campaigned against them. In this paper, we revisit the case of McCarthy's influence and investigate whether politicians fundamentally misinterpreted support for McCarthy. Using county-and state-level election data from across the twentieth century, we develop plausible counterfactual measures of normal electoral support to assess McCarthy's influence on electoral outcomes. We adopt a variety of analytic strategies that lead to a single conclusion: there is little evidence that McCarthy's attacks mattered to the election outcomes. Our results imply that politicians can greatly err when interpreting the meaning of elections, and point to the importance of research on elections to help prevent such errors.
Over the last 50 years, political scientists have learned a great deal about how public opinion manifests itself in the political process during periods of "normal politics." The mass public and political actors seem to influence each other in regular and predictable ways (Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Stimson 2004) . But not always. Sometimes demagogues rise from obscurity and capture the public's attention. Other times, elites misread public opinion and mistakenly attempt to exert influence beyond the bounds of what the public might permit.
Our paper examines a particular kind of democratic failure: politicians misperceiving public support for a public policy or person. For elected officials, accurately divining the meaning of elections is a critical part of democratic representation, but not an easy one. After all, elections are blunt instruments for the expression of political views, and the voters themselves do not define the meaning of any given election; politicians and the media take the lead in that regard (Hershey 1992) . As Shamir and Shamir argue, "How the election is understood is a major normative force in public opinion and in democratic politics…it is also significant in the conduct of politics and policy implementation following the elections" (2008, 213) .
Throughout American history, particular interpretations of elections have had real political consequences. For instance, Ronald Reagan claimed that his landslide victory in the Such claims can help shape the political landscape. To the extent that a particular interpretation-or misinterpretation-of an election becomes conventional wisdom among the political set, serious political consequences can ensue.
Given the importance of interpreting elections, a key question is: how competent are politicians at divining the public will from elections? We approach this question by reopening the case of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. 1 In the early 1950s, politicians apparently allowed themselves to be spectators to the anticommunist witch hunts conducted by McCarthy and his supporters, leading to a particularly grim chapter in American politics. Many Americans were imprisoned, thousands more lost jobs, and countless others were stigmatized as McCarthy and his supporters targeted citizens from all walks of life, including politicians, musicians, actors, and scientists (Schrecker 1998 (Alsop 1968, 8-9 (Reeves 1982, 345; White 1951 White , 1953 . him on before the fevers cool-well you don't get in a pissin' contest with a polecat" (Caro 2002, 546) .
With the benefit of hindsight, we can ask if McCarthy deserves this reputation. Was he able to punish his political opponents where it hurt them most-namely at the polls on Election
Day? The empirical record is mostly absent-almost no researchers have examined this question.
In one of the few exceptions, Polsby (1960) A vast literature in political science identifies the factors that shape senate elections, many of which we incorporate into our model. The first is the change in year-to-year partisan tides. These arise from numerous sources, but especially from the incumbent president's popularity and the national economy (Hibbing and Alford 1982; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986; Abramowitz and Segal 1986; Waterman 1990; Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991; Shields, Goidel and Tadlock 1995 1981; 2006; Adams and Squire 1997; Bardwell and Lewis-Beck 2004; Born 1991; Carson 2005; Copeland 1989; Erikson 1990; Franklin 1991; 1993; Gerber 1998; Gomez and Wilson 2003; Grofman, Brunell, and Koetzle 1998; Hibbing and Brandes 1983; Highton 2004; Hill 1997; Jacobson 2005; Kahn and Kenny 1997; Kahn 1991; Kuklinski and West 1981; Miller 1990; Ragsdale and Rusk 1995; Segura and Nicholson 1995; Squire 1991; 1992; Tufte 1975; Westlye 1983. our analysis (though analyses that include the South are essentially the same as those presented here [ Table 2 about here]
Perhaps, though, this average effect conceals important heterogeneity. As Table 1 demonstrates, McCarthy intervened in a variety of races, but he likely exercised more effort-as challengers in particular races, those actions had no effect on the election outcome. 16 The online appendix presents robustness checks using a simple dichotomy for candidate quality as well as other robustness checks.
measured by the number of speeches and the press coverage-in some races than he did in others. To disaggregate the average effect, we next replace the single McCarthy indicator variable with a series of 12 indicator variables, one for each race in which he attempted to exert influence. Table 3 presents the estimates. Our analysis here mirrors the specifications in Table 2 .
For ease of exposition, Figure 1 graphically presents the coefficients and confidence intervals for each of the races using the most complete model (column 3 of Table 3 ). In some cases,
McCarthy's efforts were associated with a statistically significant Democratic underperformance in the election. In others, however, his efforts were associated with a statistically significant [ Table 3 about here]
[ Figure 1 about here]
Even some of the races that helped solidify McCarthy's reputation as a political force are suspect. 18 Although the estimates suggest that McCarthy's targets fared better than expected as often as they fared worse, Figure 1 shows that two of McCarthy's targets did fare especially 17 Moody was appointed to the Senate only the year before the election. 18 In fact, Democrats do slightly better in states where McCarthy received more news coverage, based on the measure in Table 1 . Tydings, who actually outperformed the governor (see Table 4 ). In the McFarland race, 1952
was simply a bad year for Democrats in Arizona and McFarland actually did better than other Democrats, receiving more vote share than the Democratic presidential candidate and gubernatorial candidate (see Table 4 ). All told, examining individual races reinforces our conclusion that McCarthy exerted no reliable effect on his targets.
[ Table 4 about here]
One scenario not accounted for in our analysis is that McCarthy might have changed the overall dynamics of the Senate races of 1950 and 1952. 19 In particular, his attacks may have harmed Democrats nationwide, not just those he intervened against. If so, our tests may be biased against finding a McCarthy effect. To check the robustness of our findings against this threat, we estimated a modified version of the model in 
Results-other races as counterfactuals
To estimate McCarthy's influence, we thus far have relied on a model-based approach.
We have compared how McCarthy's targets fared to how the models predict they should have fared. This approach comes with a cost; if the models are wrong, the estimates are likely biased.
Fortunately, we can also use a non-model-based approach to answer the same question. One concern with the results presented in Table 4 is that McCarthy may have hurt all
Democrats in these states, not just the Democrats he targeted. We explored and rejected a related concern about a general McCarthy effect at the national level in our regression-based analysis above. In the second-to-last row of Table 4 , we address this related concern using our non- Figure 1) . vote 1938-1964 1950-1964 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
